



MEDEMAP

Report on trust in media and democratic institutions in Europe

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DELIVERABLE 5.2

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary	3
Introduction	4
5.2.1 Trust, Democracy and Media: Theoretical considerations	5
5.2.1.1 Trust, or an “Invisible Social Glue”	5
5.2.1.2. Institutions, Trust and Distrust	8
5.2.1.3. Trust, Democracy and Media	12
5.2.2 Seeing Media Trust Through Data: Framework, Topics and Analytical Commentary	16
5.2.2.1 Framework for data collection	16
5.2.2.2 Commentary on data	17
5.2.2.2.1 Trust in media in general	17
5.2.2.2.2 Trust in specific types of media (radio, tv, press, internet, online social network)	20
5.2.2.2.3 Trust in specific types of news sources	26
5.2.2.2.4 Trust in the information provided by the media (by country)	28
5.2.2.2.5. Special topics: old media vs new media by age, ideology and ecosystem for news about Covid-19	32
5.2.2.2.6. Trust in Institutions	42
Discussion and Concluding Remarks	45
References	48
Data Sources	51
Appendix 1	53
Appendix 2	64

Executive Summary

The Deliverable 5.2 explores the relations between trust, media and democracy in the European Union from conceptual and data-driven perspectives. In the first part, we discuss trust as a fundamental institution of social life and relate it to notions of expertise and trustworthiness. In this context, trust in institutions is a key element of social stability yet it needs to be combined by a degree of citizen mistrust that can inspire civic action. In the second part, we look at trust in respect to data coming from different sources, such as Pew Internet Research Center, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Standard Eurobarometer and Eurofound. We provide analytical commentaries for the tables and subtopics, and, following, we discuss our preliminary findings on the interplay between trust, media and democracy in the context of EU.

Introduction

Task 5.2.

Assessing trust in media and democratic institutions in Europe. By drawing on secondary data provided by various sources, we will assess the state of people's trust in news media and democratic institutions. As trust is a main pillar for the stability of any system, and European system as well, we will consider the role of trust in the relationships between media, participation and political beliefs related to democracy and EU.

The Deliverable 5.2 looks at questions around trust in media and democratic institutions in Europe and the state of media trust in the European Union. We draw on sociological conceptualizations of trust in order to assert and complicate the latter's role in relation to media, democracy and institutions. This allows us to ground the discussion and contextualize the data that we look in the second part as well as create a framework for approaching trust in the later deliverables of this Work Package, such as the analysis of D 5.4.

The first part (5.2.1) discusses the ways in which trust is indispensable for any social system to survive and grow while it outlines our approach to trust as a social practice grounded on institutional processes. In section 5.2.1.1, we think through trust in relation to expertise and expert institutions, its interplay with the notion of distrust as well as the question of trustworthiness, which necessarily depends on external, and up to a degree normative, value judgements. In the second section, 5.2.1.2, we discuss trust vis-à-vis institutions and democracy while highlighting the value of mistrust from the perspective of citizenship as a form of civic duty. In the third part, 5.2.1.3, we look at trust in reference to media and Europe. Overall, while recognizing the vital role of trust for maintaining democratic legitimacy and advancing social good, our conceptualization aims to broaden up the linear and sometimes mechanistic idea that trust in institutions is always something univocally good and strengthens democratic modes of governance (see also Carey, 2017). Insofar as democracy constitutively aims to empower the people, we need to leave space for the right (or the duty) of the citizens to (reasonably) mistrust power within a democratic participatory framework. In this discussion, democratic values, including freedom of expression, transparency, pluralism, human dignity, transparency and participation (as discussed in other deliverables), should be used as a guiding yardstick in assessing whether trusting institutions is a good think from a democratic perspective. Shortly,

similarly to the previous deliverable, we need to always contextualize and ask, “who trusts what?”, a question that will be illuminated in more detail in the qualitative analysis of D 5.4 for the respective countries.

In the second part, 5.2.2, we look at trust in respect to data coming from different sources, such as Pew Internet Research Center, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and Standard Eurobarometer 90 (2018), 94 (2020-2021), and 100 (2023), and Eurofound. We extracted the data via four criteria: 1) the panel data platform selection, 2) the location of data collection, 3) the date of collection, and 4) the topics foregrounded by the panel data regarding media trust. We came up with six topics for which we provide tables that we briefly discuss, namely: ‘Trust in media in general’, ‘Trust in specific types of media (radio, tv, press, internet, online social network)’, ‘Trust in specific types of news sources’, ‘Trust in the information provided by the media (by country)’, ‘Special topics: old media vs new media by age, ideology and ecosystem for news about Covid-19’, and ‘Trust in Institutions’. After providing analytical commentaries on these topics, we discuss the assumptions and preliminary findings around the interplay between trust, media and democracy in the context of EU.

5.2.1 Trust, Democracy and Media: Theoretical considerations

5.2.1.1 Trust, or an “Invisible Social Glue”

Georg Simmel defines trust as “a hypothesis regarding future behavior, a hypothesis certain enough to serve as a basis for practical conduct”, or, in other words, a confident speculation that things will go one way rather than another (1950, pp. 318–19). Even if not explicitly visible, trust in Simmel’s sense is a virtually omnipresent institution regulating social life, an “invisible ‘social glue’” that is conspicuous only when it is absent” (D’ Cruz, 2020, p. 41), and in this regard it concerns a belief that goes far beyond the questions of European democracy and media, where this deliverable focuses on. Trust refers to the belief that another person, institution or entity has both the will and the capacity to fulfil a (prescribed) task, command or obligation (Simpson, 2012; Robbins, 2016). As such, trust exists, at least as an expectation, in numerous daily activities and is connected with a sense of safety, which is foundational for everyday transactions, relations and life overall, as “without trust, society as we know it could not exist” (Schilke, Reimann and Cook, 2021, p. 239). Trust mostly concerns an embodied, rather than theoretical expectation, in the sense that the belief that something or someone is

expected to accomplish a task relates to the underlying commitments upon which social reality evolves and our lives unfurl. This can apply, for instance, to numerous trivial things, such as that we expect that a payment we receive will be recognized by others as a currency for purchasing goods and in this regard we trust the commitment that the national banking system has to deliver and ensure the means for exchange. Hawley, thus, argues that “to trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to rely upon her to meet that commitment” (2014, p. 10), and thus trust hinges upon countless implicit social contracts that outline such commitments and obligations. Such implicit social contracts are numerous and demarcate fields of both social obligations and expectations. These social contracts are a site of struggle insofar as there are not only numerous but different so the possibility of social frustration or even conflict becomes virtually unavoidable.

Indeed, trust in society or in the collective behaviour of others to meet their (implicit) commitments, is essential for the very maintenance of everyday life and survival (Warren, 2018). Total distrust in society or of the collective behaviour of others would make life intolerable, if not paranoid. When we engage in such a mundane activity as crossing the street, for instance, we subconsciously trust that the drivers are not going to violate the red traffic light and run over us. Apart from relying on the goodwill and kindness of unknown drivers, however, trust to the unknown other requires institutional intervention; a higher authority, such as the state, for instance, needs to regulate collective or individual behaviour so that drivers get punished if violating the red light, a punishment which can extend from administrative fines to jail time. Or, when we turn on the electrical switch, we trust that the infrastructure of “electricity” will work and light will appear in the space. If the infrastructure of electricity does not work, this may cause anger or frustration, which, if collectively enabled, can lead up to distrusting the state, the government or the higher authority. In this sense, the construction of widespread trust is necessary for a society to function (and essential for the legitimization of political power) and is the result of a combination of moral, legal and infrastructural institutions; it is therefore (especially in societies of high complexity) principally an *institutionally-driven process* rather than an organic occurrence among citizens (see also, Wang and Gordon, 2011). In complex modern societies, social trust, i.e. interpersonal trust among people, is mediated by institutional trust (Sønderskov and Dinesen, 2016). In principle, the greater the citizen trust in likewise institutional processes (more on ‘institutions’ in the next section) the more stable the society is, ensuring cohesion, future development and well-being.

For these institutional processes to gain legitimacy there should be collectively generated belief that they have the knowledge and indeed the expertise to address and provide

solutions to social problems, dangers and risks. The reflexivity theorists of the 1980s and the 1990s (e.g., Beck, 1992, 2022; Giddens, 1991, 1994), argued that modern societies entail a number of risks for individuals, ranging from pollution and accidents to unemployment and social alienation and, thus, modern power has to continuously generate trust among citizens so as to avert the countless risks that accompany the rise of industrialization. Giddens defines trust as “confidence in the reliability of a person or system” (1991, p. 34), that is confidence to that the person or the system will perform its purported function. Therefore, the creation of trust is linked to the belief that a system or a person has the expertise to carry a respective commitment. According to this macro-sociological approach, trust depends on expert systems that we have no immediate contact with, e.g., the unknown driver or the infrastructure of electricity (we will come back to the discussion about expert systems later on regarding media). While these expert systems may sound as faraway abstractions, they are, as referred to above, integrated in the social fabric and “embodied”, in the sense that they dramatically impact the way we carry ourselves in the world. Generally, if we did not have such (often unquestionable) trust to expert authorities, including people (unknown to us) and infrastructures (that we do not control) the society would not be able to function. If, say, feelings of extreme suspicion dominate everyday transactions, members of society would seek alternative trusting systems to the state. Champeyrache (2022) argues for instance that the mafia systems, or the expansion of organized crime in general, is often based on cultivating systems of trust with disillusioned people who distrust official state authorities.

However destructive the absence of trust in social institutions can be, the discussion needs to be broadened up: sometimes the absence of trust in social institutions is not necessarily bad as sometimes a system *deserves not to be trusted*. This is a discussion we mostly carry on in the next section but for now we can introduce the notion of “trustworthiness”, or, in other words, the idea of whether a political system is indeed credible and deserves to be trusted. This question entails a value judgement that has necessarily a normative dimension, in the sense that some general (democratic) principles should be established in order to assess the trustworthiness of institutions attached to a political system (more in 5.2.1.3). A political system, for instance, may claim to be democratic, declaring to support values like freedom of expression, pluralism and transparency, but in practice to undermine these very values. In this regard, this system may be deemed untrustworthy from a (normative) democratic point of view, and, as such, low levels of trust against this system can indicate a healthy reaction among the citizens. In other words, following O’ Neil, we can argue that “a low (or reduced) level of trust can provide a reason for seeking to ‘restore’ trust only if there is also evidence that those who

are mistrusted, or less trusted, are in fact trustworthy” (2020, p. 42). When, in other words, we speak of diminished trust in social institutions, we need to determine, or at least explore, whether these social institutions deserve to be trusted in the first place. While a detailed analysis of this is beyond the scope of this deliverable, this is a matter that needs to be taken into account in the analysis that will follow in the next deliverables insofar as mistrust or distrust have a social undercurrent that can correspond to real world problems.

To summarize this section, trust is an indispensable resource for the stability of a social and political system. It can legitimize the government’s rule by offering (an often unquestionable) confidence to the citizens to rely on for advancing their interests. From a democratic point of view, however, high trust is a positive indicator only insofar as we deem this system trustworthy. In the next section, we turn to the interplay between trust and institutions as well as on the role of distrust, which further complicates the somewhat straightforward doxa of ‘trust is good for democracy’.

5.2.1.2. Institutions, Trust and Distrust

In modern societies, as referred to above, trust in political power refers to an *institutionally-driven process*, rather than a spontaneous activity, and relies on state-driven institutions, such as the legal system. Thus, institutions play a key role around discussions around democracy trust. How can we however conceptualize institutions from the perspective of modern societies? From a sociological perspective, institutions refer to structures that constrain and shape human behaviour (Holm, 1995), or, more broadly, to “systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson 2006, p. 2). In Durkheimian functionalist sociology, institutions exist in order to serve certain social functions, helping, for example, to align “individual and collective interests” (Holm, 1995, p. 399). In this view, institutions emulate the needs of the people, maintaining a strictly operational purpose, that is to say, to glue a society together and allow for its development. Weber’s idea of the “iron cage” in reference to the development of bureaucracy, which is an institutionalized rationalisation entangling individuals in systems of efficiency and control, is influential for this sociological tradition that sees institutions in terms of effective governance. Despite their restraining nature, however, institutions maintain moving, conflicting and shifting rather than determinate roles, that is, while institutions are *done* by social actors and the state in certain ways they can also be *undone* and *redone* in other ways. Institutions are from this point of view porous and even precarious systems whose relevance is not always stable; they have to perform this relevance

socially in relation to certain, often changing, social, economic, political and technological circumstances and thus they *change themselves* (e.g., Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2009; Lawrence, Thomas and Suddaby, 2006; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The trust that people have in institutions is central to this process: to avoid illegitimacy, and thus social irrelevance, institutions have to adapt to larger institutional habits and traits across shifting social values (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Institutions of course do not have unlimited agency to decide or adapt to circumstances on their own; insofar as certain institutions, such as the law or media, are regulated and practiced in given political and economic contexts they are subject to power relations prevailing in society at large.

The citizenry suspicion that institutions are either incapable to fulfill their role or they are willingly undermining the interests of people (e.g., in favour of these of the elites) can potentially cultivate “anti-systemic” narratives and interpretations of various phenomena. What is commonly called “conspiracy theories” is a good example of that. Conspiracy theories “refer to concrete beliefs that institutions, or individual actors associated with them, collude in secret to pursue malevolent goals”, and are therefore product of bad faith (Van Prooijen, Spadaro and Wang, 2020). In this sense, trust is key to institutions of democracy, insofar as democracy is (presumably at least) based on deliberation and (as much as possible) rational decision-making between (relatively) free individuals. When there is distrust on an institution, authority or a person, “even evidence of positive behavior and intentions is likely to be received with suspicion, to be interpreted as misleading, and, when properly understood, as negative after all [as] distrust can go so far as to corrode our sense of reality” and cultivate “an unrealistic, conspiratorial, indeed virtually paranoid view of the world” (Govier 1992, p. 55. Quoted in D’Cruz, 2020). Also, conspiracy theories work at the level of distrust in ideas and knowledge (not only institutions, authorities or persons), and this means that such theories can develop as a result of distrusting, for instance, the very idea of democracy. The extreme distrust manifested in conspiratorial thinking is threatening to democracy insofar as it is based on irrationality, instead of informed debate. We need of course to remember that the term “conspiracy” is a negative label that is usually attached to antagonistic social actors by their enemies and in this case what constitutes conspiracy or not is not always self-evident (Haiven, Kingsmith and Komporozos-Athanasiou, 2022). At least in the Western world, there are plenty of media-driven conspiracy theories (or theories verging to the conspiratorial) that showcase instances of extreme distrust in the democratic system (Jeppesen, Giroux, Hoehsmann, ulthiin, VanDyke and McKee, 2022).

However, the idea that institutional trust is the backbone or indeed the horizon where every democratic power should be heading to is not always as straightforward (more on democratic power, see below). Indeed, the relationship between trust and distrust vis-a-vis democratic power requires further elaboration, and a look beyond the typical “apotheosis of trust”, as Corey calls it (2017, p. 1), that permeates social theory. Insofar as “to distrust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and yet not rely upon her to meet that commitment” (Hawley 2014:10), a level of distrust is fundamental for the maintenance of democratic institutions as it can introduce a healthy amount of doubt and suspicion in how common affairs are managed. As Warren notes, historically, “democracy was based on distrust” (2018, p. 76), that is on the power of the people to question and eventually rearrange the ways they are governed. Democracy, as most democratic theories would argue, can never be an accomplished state of things but a horizon towards which societies are moving (Welzel, 2021), and, in this regard, a democratic order needs to open spaces for questioning both institutions and the social actors who are in charge of them. This does not of course mean that democratic institutions should intentionally make mistakes so that people become distrustful, but that doubt, questioning and distrust to any authority is an aspect that should be promoted by the educational system and other literacy-related institutions, including the media. The European Council itself notes, “(t) rue democracy is not possible without a free media scrutinising those in power”.¹

This discussion is reflected in the debate that Carpentier and Wimmer raise in D 2.1. around, on the one hand, the importance of trust for democratic participation and, on the other, the necessity of a level of distrust against state authorities for maintaining a level of citizen’s agency and critical awareness. On the one hand, thus, Carpentier and Wimmer consider trust as a “condition of possibility for democracy” together with other conditions like access, interaction, engagement and knowledge. Following Peter Dahlgren, who argues that “a minimal level of ‘horizontal’ trust, that is, between citizens, is necessary for the emergence of the social bonds of cooperation between those who collectively engage in politics” (2013, p. 24), Carpentier and Wimmer note that democratic participation relies on a level of trust between citizens and the state, or here European authorities (p. 22). In this regard, the EU, as a supranational body regulating politics, should be actively cultivating trust, as “trust in the democratic institutions is seen as important to the functioning of democracy itself” (p. 22). On the other hand, however, blindly trusting state authorities can be problematic and undermine

¹ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/media-freedom-eu/>

democratic functions in the long term, since the latter depends on the citizen's own critical thinking and questioning. The discussion on the fundamental role of trust in building democratic institutions has "a counter-pendant, as distrust is also seen as an important component in the relation between citizens and the democratic state", as distrust "allows for critical evaluations of the workings of the state and for democratic participation to play its role" (p. 22). We can therefore make a provisional distinction between horizontal trust and vertical trust in political institutions; there is always some connection between (the vertical) trust in state/institutions and (the horizontal trust) between citizens: if fundamental state institutions such as healthcare, energy infrastructure etc. suddenly collapse, then this may encourage suspicions among people. On the other hand, if we think of the Greek economic crisis, where there was an ongoing collapse of some state institutions between 2010-2015, the rather reverse happened, as citizens tended to trust each other more and as they trusted the state less.

Going back to the discussion on trustworthiness, we can see how "to not rely on others to meet their commitments (in particular, when you have good reason to believe that they will not meet them)" is part and parcel of the participatory nature of democratic society (Matthes, 2015, p. 4 in D' Cruz, 2020). While what exactly is the 'right amount' of distrust is something to be debated, which should indeed be done contextually, the process of "cultivating a healthy distrust, particularly of elected representatives, is constitutive of a well-functioning democracy, independently of whether or not it happens, in a given instance, to guard against tyranny" (Matthes, 2015, p. 4 in D' Cruz, 2020). Since all societies are permeated by antagonism that cannot be eliminated but only mediated by politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987), social agents may rightfully suspect that elected representatives would have a vested interest to maintain their privileges and power, corroding in the process public institutions. A further thing to notice is that distrust is variable depending on the reason one distrusts an entity, which is an idea to bear in mind when analysing the data in the next section and in the qualitative analysis in D 5.4. As D'Cruz puts it, "If distrust is based on suspicion of ill will, the reactive attitude of resentment will be to the fore", while "[i]f distrust is based on pessimism about competence, then distrust will manifest itself more as wariness or vexation than as moral anger (2020, p. 46). This choreography of the mutually constitutive relationship between maintaining a level of trust and a level of distrust is helpful for approaching the questions of this task (and later for the analysis of interviews and focus groups) as it complicates the more linear assumption discussed above, according to which higher levels of trust are inherently beneficial for democracy (and the assumption that its loss can only signify a coming collapse).

Overall, the question between trust and levels of democracy that concerns this task needs to be approached with caution, as a very trustful population can prove obedient to (any) orders of the state, which can often resort to undemocratic measures. At the same time, these insights are helpful for the qualitative analysis of interviews and focus groups as we can draw attention to the micro-decisions and everyday factors that shape one's attitude to trusting or distrusting media and participating in democratic processes in general. Similarly to D 5.1, we here argue that the qualitative analysis in 5.3. gives us the opportunity to explore relations of trust, media and democracy in their complexity and non-linear unfolding.

5.2.1.3. Trust, Democracy and Media

The mode of power within which social action takes place that concerns us here is, of course, democracy. Democracy, as Carpentier and Wimmer note (2023), is an empty signifier insofar as different political actors, from far right to far left engage in a struggle to fill the word with (their) meaning. Despite its signifiatory ambivalence, however, the concept of democracy at its most basic sense indicates that political power should belong to the people of a given constituency and that these people should be able to freely decide (or simply consent) on how resources are allocated in the public sphere. From this institutional perspective, a useful yardstick definition of democracy refers to it as the “institutions and associations that enable people to engage in collective self-government” (Warren, 2018, p. 75). A democratic media environment advances values of pluralism, transparency, dignity, freedom of expression and participation (D 3.1). Again, these values have a normative dimension (yet in reality their intensities and degrees are always open for debate among antagonistic actors). As we saw in D2.1 and D5.1, for instance, participation in democratic public sphere can range from the extremes of minimalist participation (e.g., voting) to maximalist participation (e.g., actively engaging in debates around inclusion and exclusion). Normatively speaking then, and given the key role of trust in people's well-being, as described above, a democratic order should be grounded on institutions that can cultivate relationships of trust among citizenry as these relationships can help developing self-rule.

Media is one of the institutions that can (potentially) “enable people to engage in collective self-government” within a democratic order by providing accurate information, stirring debate and maintaining an as much as possible inclusive agenda. As a social institution intertwining a material (e.g., infrastructure, employees) and a discursive side (e.g. values,

ideologies) (Carpentier, 2017), media has a normative role within a democratic modern society, which is to deliver news and as much as possible unbiased information to the citizens. High citizen trust in media then denotes that the public's perception is that the media are indeed more or less fulfilling its social role. Apart from trusting individual media, there is the trust in a *media system*, which in a democratic context means that this system is capable of hosting plural perspectives, allow for freedom of expression, encourage debate and that this media system is both willing and capable to fulfil its commitment to tell the truth, counter conspiracies, lies and avoid public manipulation. In this picture, we need to add the rise of fake news and digital platform scandals (such as, the Cambridge Analytica) as an important factor driving media distrust, enabling cynical responses and numbing citizen's participation. This, in turn, implies that apart from the quality of reporting and overall integrity of media organizations, they are larger systemic forces that may undermine trust in media institutions among citizens.

From the perspective of the people, trust in media within a democratic order is context-dependent (see D 5.1), in the sense that it depends on a citizen's political ideas, which may (or may not) be democratic. In any case, "if we no longer trust the media", as Mario Schranz, Jörg Schneider and Mark Eisenegger note, "our trust in reasoned political decision-making is also lost and our willingness to accept political decisions declines" (2018, p. 74). Indeed, in liberal capitalist democracies, on the one hand, media "should be organised as a free-market system on the grounds that any form of public ownership or legal regulation (beyond the barest minimum) endangers media freedom" (Curran, 2011, p. 9). On the other hand, however, as "free market can have debilitating effects on the media", there is a double bind, that is "the need to have a free market and to negate its adverse effects without involving the state", whose solution is to "develop a tradition of professionalism among journalists. In this way, the media can remain free, yet serve the people" (Curran, 2011, p. 9). In this sense, trust in media in a democratic context, at least in principle, coincides with trust in how well media (allow to) practice journalistic ethics, that is, to resist economic and political pressure and be as much as possible unbiased. We should however note here that trust in media (and of journalistic professionalism) is not independent of questions around who controls and owns the media, and thus of policy and ownership, that is of questions of political-economic nature. The well-known thesis of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in their book 'Manufacturing Consent' (1988) is that the dominant political and economic classes in liberal democracies use legacy media to construct hegemony among citizens around their own ideological and material interests. In this regard, and contrary to the "normative" role of media referred to above, we can also argue that (partly at least) trust in media can also be something "manufactured", in the sense that media

can convince the population that they are doing their job well. Furthermore, in this context, something to consider is the balance between how open and closed media are to “non-elite” members of the society. If media are experienced as pure elite systems, only serving the needs of elites and populated internally by elites, then trust might get jeopardized: media will be seen as serving exclusively the upper class. On the other hand, if they are totally open to everyone’s participation, there is no space for expertise, and trust might also be jeopardized. In this sense, we need to consider how open media can practically be without doing away with expertise.

In the context of liberal democratic power, including the EU, there is typically both a public and private broadcast system, which at a very fundamental level together shape the media system within respective national, political and economic contexts. As noted above, some key values of the EU media system are freedom of expression and media pluralism (Klimkiewitz, 2010; see also, D 3.1) and in this regard “trust” in the EU media systems at least from the perspective of EU authorities should reflect one way or another these values. The EU statements point to the idea that these values are fundamental for trusting a media system, as among EU’s declared aims is to “combat political interference in editorial decisions for both private and public service media providers, protect journalists and their sources, and guarantee media freedom and pluralism” (European Commission, nd). Individual EU countries have varying levels of media trust while, in this regard, citizen trust in the EU expresses an aggregate number which does not do justice in the ways that people across specific territories and local debates trust or distrust the EU and institutions). As Carpentier and Wimmer argue by looking at the EBU report on trust and media, which is based on data from Eurobarometer data (more on this in 5.2.2), there is a certain level of distrust permeating European audiences and publics but this level varies among different European countries. While the “average of the 28 EU countries is 40%, which implies that a substantial part of the European population reports a limited trust in media”, countries “such as Finland, Albania and the Netherlands have their ‘low trust’ category around 20%, while in the UK, Spain, North Macedonia and Greece, the ‘low trust’ category is over 50% in size” (:75). This data shows that there is no necessary correlation between media trust and geography (e.g., South and North of Europe) as different European countries trust (or not) media irrespectively of region and this also further complicates the theory of media systems. Furthermore, this complicates, again, the linear assumption between trust in media institutions (especially legacy institutions) and degrees of trust in the EU.

Apart from the traditional media, such as TV and radio, which are generally trusted the most in Europe, we can notice increase in trust in online media and groups, You Tube bloggers and Influencers. Indicatively, from 2022 to 2023 (fig. 1), there is an aggregate increase of 11

% in the online news sources while an aggregate decline of 2% in traditional media (public and private) and the written press. As discussed in D 5.1, this process of disintermediation implies the rise as new intermediary figures whose opinions can be taken somewhat seriously. Baker and Rojek argue that the rise of these figures happens because contemporary societies are “low trust societies”, meaning that people do not trust the institutions are they used to (2020). Digital platforms amplify this process as they can spread more easily discourses across the globe. Baker (2022) offers the example of wellness culture gurus, who continuously undermine the institution of conventional medicine. One can argue that bloggers and Influencers are not part of a country’s media system insofar as they act independently, yet on the other hand, insofar as a rising number of people trust these figures for their news consumption they are part of the national informational landscape. We then suggest exploring in D 5.4. the trust (and distrust) to online personalities in order to understand its effects, causes and broader ways that their presence impacts the ways people see the intertwining of media democracy.




Figure 1: Trust in News Sources. EUROBAROMETER 2023

Before moving on to the next section, where we explore these questions in more detail, we should underline that public opinion surveys on trust should be treated with caution. First, we need to have accurate and comparable previous data, which should reflect the methods of the current data collection and address the same issues with the same phrasing (which is not always the case). Also, we should bear in mind that data from previous decades was referring to a different media environment, where social media and mobile phones were not as present as they are now (and, to our knowledge there is no data about trust to online figures before the past few years). A general, substantial criticism of quantitative surveys is that they are usually

not flexible enough to react adequately to social developments and changes, but instead perpetuate patterns that have been used for a long time, leading to (re)production of bias.

Thus, even then if comparable data is available, we need, to qualitatively contextualize the responses and see how trust converses with other aspects of one's lifeworld. Finally, a decline on trust levels may not immediately indicate the need to "restore" trust (D' Cruz, 2020), as this, to go back to the discussion of trustworthiness, needs to be discussed on the basis of whether a system deserves to be trusted in the first place. To sum up, we suggested in this section the need for questioning the indispensable correlation between trust in state authorities and democratic practices, the focus on the interplay between trust and distrust for advancing democratic politics and the necessity to consider the above in questions around media use and consumption in the qualitative analysis of our interviews and focus groups.

5.2.2 Seeing Media Trust Through Data: Framework, Topics and Analytical Commentary

For this second part of the deliverable, we collected statistical secondary data from various sources and organized it thematically. Below we provide the framework for data collection and we move on to present the topics and tables together with brief analytical commentaries.

5.2.2.1 Framework for data collection

The methodology for extracting data is arranged around a framework which is organized around four criteria: 1) the panel data platform selection, 2) the location of data collection, 3) the date of collection, and 4) the topics foregrounded by the panel data platforms regarding media trust. First, the criterion for selecting panel data platform builds on the platform's selection adopted in the Eumeplat Project WP1 (Miconi, 2021). The following survey panel platforms were identified as relevant sources of report on data about media trust:

- Pew Internet Research Center (<https://www.pewresearch.org/topic/internet-technology/>);

- Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism *Reuters Reports on Digital Journalism*, editions 2007-2021 (<https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk>);
- Standard Eurobarometer 90 (2018), 94 (2020-2021), and 100 (2023);

Second, the criterion concerning the location of data collection, includes media trust data for Europe but also selectively for the US and the world. Specific data panel specialized in different geographical areas, so for example the Pew Internet Research Center provides media trust data concerning the US, whereas Eurobarometer provides media trust data collected in Europe. We have collected selective tables for the US as we believed that some issues are important for the discussion on media and trust (i.e., mostly on media trust by ideology) and for which there was no available European data. Third, the date of collection criterion focuses on identifying data collected at 3 points in time extracted 3 years from each other - that is, a) latest reports (2022/2023), b) reports that covers media trust data collected during Covid-19 pandemic time (2020/2021), and c) reports of data collected during in the 3 years preceding Covid-19 pandemic time (2017/2018). For context we have also included the earliest available data about media trust published in one of these reports, - which covers the date range between 2009 and 2018. Finally, the data extraction framework also included topics that were included in operational definitions of media trust, as these served to formulate survey questions.

The data extraction was organized around the criteria outlined above and produced the following topics pertaining to the statistical data around different facets of media trust and, consequently, operational articulations of media trust. The topics that we identified within media trust for our analysis are the following 1. Trust in media in general, 2. Trust in specific types of media, 3. Trust in specific types of news sources, 4. Trust in the information provided by the media 5. Special Topics: ideology, Covid-19, AI. 6. Trust in Institutions.

5.2.2.2 Commentary on data

5.2.2.2.1 Trust in media in general

<i>Trust in media in general 2023 (Eurobarometer 2023)</i>
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The table below is survey that took place Oct/Nov 2023 in the EU, showing that most respondents in the EU have a lack of trust in the media. Approximately 39% do trust the media, which reflects a three percentage point rise since the previous inquiry conducted in May/June 2023. Nevertheless, most EU citizens (57%, -3 pp) are more sceptical of them. This trust, as mentioned in the first part, varies greatly among the 27 EU Member States. In six countries, a majority of respondents have trust in the media: Finland (72%), Portugal (61%), Sweden (57%), Austria (56%) and Denmark and the Netherlands (55%). In Greece, only one in five trust the media (20%) while in countries such as France, Malta, and Slovenia the percentage stands at around one quarter (26%) (these countries have the highest percentage of respondents who express a lack of trust in the media). In 14 EU Member States, there has been an increase in the share of respondents who tend to trust the media compared to winter 2022-2023. The trust level has seen significant increases in Austria (56%, +9%), Germany (44%, +8%), and Italy (38%, +7 %). In contrast, the figure has decreased in 11 countries, with notable declines in Denmark (55%, -7 %), Czechia (38%, -6 %), and Belgium (43%, -5 %). Poland (40%) and Lithuania (39%) have remained unchanged. We need to bear into consideration that this table expresses only trust in media as *abstract* institutions as it neither asks about the type of media (radio, press, TV, digital media) nor about specific media channels or the national context. The term “media” here represents a mental image of the institution itself, or, in other words, it relates to the perception that the respondents themselves have about what media are. It is in this sense, the table below is useful to the extent that it shows what Europeans believe about media, without being offered a normative definition of media.

QA6.1 How much trust do you have in certain institutions? For each of the following institutions, do you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
The media (%)

		EU27	AT	DE	IT	EE	RO	SK	BG	ES	FR	HR	HU	MT	IE	SI	LT	PL	CY	LV	NL	PT	SE	EL	LU	FI	BE	CZ	DK
Tend to trust	Oct/Nov 2023	39	56	44	38	44	44	37	44	30	26	37	31	26	42	26	39	40	27	42	55	61	57	20	37	72	43	38	55
	Δ May/Jun 2023	▲3	▲9	▲8	▲7	▲6	▲6	▲6	▲5	▲3	▲2	▲2	▲2	▲2	▲1	▲1	=	=	▼2	▼2	▼2	▼2	▼2	▼3	▼3	▼3	▼5	▼6	▼7
Tend not to trust	Oct/Nov 2023	57	38	52	58	51	52	59	48	68	71	60	67	68	52	73	58	52	69	53	43	37	41	79	59	23	55	58	41
	Δ May/Jun 2023	▼3	▼10	▼8	▼7	▼7	▼7	▼7	▼6	▼2	▼1	▼4	▼3	▼4	▼3	▲3	▲1	▼2	=	▲3	▲2	▲2	▲2	▲3	▲6	▲2	▲5	▲4	▲5
Don't know	Oct/Nov 2023	4	5	4	4	4	3	3	7	3	4	1	1	4	4	5	4	6	2	6	2	2	2	1	7	4	2	2	2
	Δ May/Jun 2023	=	▲1	=	=	▲1	▲1	▲1	▲1	▼1	▼1	▲2	▲1	▲2	▲2	▼4	▼1	▲2	▲2	▼1	=	=	=	=	▼3	▲1	=	▲2	▲2

Table. 1. Trust in media in general. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2023)

Trust in media (general), sociodemographic analysis, 2023 (Eurobarometer 2023)

The sociodemographic analysis in the table 2 shows only a small difference in levels of trust in media across various age groups in the EU. For the respondents aged 15-24 the trust level is at 43%, while it is slightly lower at 38-39% among respondents aged from 25 onwards. This shows that there is only *slight variation in levels of trust according to age*. This is the *same for gender* as 39% of men and 40 % of women trust the media (these are the only two gender categories that data shows). There is a more noticeable variation in levels of trust in education backgrounds. People who finished their full-time education at the age of 20 or older tend to have a greater level of trust in the media compared to those who completed their education at a younger age (43% versus 35%).

There are more noticeable differences when it comes to the socio-professional categories people belong in, financial situation and class. Managers, who can generally hold “status jobs”, have the highest level of trust in the media, with 44%, which is significantly higher than the trust level among the unemployed, which stands at 24%. This trend is similar to the financial position a person inhabits in the economy as respondents who have fewer financial difficulties generally exhibit higher levels of trust. Specifically, 43% of people who rarely or almost never struggle to pay their bills trust the media in contrast to 26% of those who have most of the time difficulties to pay the bills. Those who belong to the working class have the lowest trust in media (32%) in contrast to those who belong to the upper middle class or the upper class. In this sense, to go back to the interplay between trust and mistrust, we can argue that those who are economically excluded *do have a point for distrusting the media*, among other modern institutions, since economic inequality can be a valid reason (from a normative democratic perspective) to criticize the system.

QA6.1 How much trust do you have in certain institutions? For each of the following institutions, do you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? The media (% - EU)

	Tend to trust	Tend not to trust	Don't know
EU27	39	57	4
Gender			
Man	39	58	3
Woman	40	56	4
Age			
15-24	43	54	3
25-39	38	58	4
40-54	38	58	4
55+	39	57	4
Education (End of)			
15-	35	60	5
16-19	35	61	4
20+	43	54	3
Still studying	49	48	3
Socio-professional category			
Self-employed	41	55	4
Managers	44	53	3
Other white collars	38	59	3
Manual workers	35	61	4
House persons	36	59	5
Unemployed	24	73	3
Retired	40	56	4
Students	49	48	3
Difficulties paying bills			
Most of the time	26	70	4
From time to time	35	62	3
Almost never/ Never	43	53	4
Consider belonging to			
The working class	31	65	4
The lower middle class	36	61	3
The middle class	42	55	3
The upper middle class	51	46	3
The upper class	43	52	5
Image of the EU			
Positive	55	42	3
Neutral	32	63	5
Negative	17	81	2

Table 2. Trust in media (general), demographic analysis. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2023)

5.2.2.2.2 Trust in specific types of media (radio, tv, press, internet, online social network)

Trust in specific types of media – comparison 2017-2018. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2018)

This is an indicative table about trust in various types of media in Europe, including the written press, radio, television, social media and the internet (such as search engines). Table 3 shows that levels of overall trust in the above have decreased slightly between 2017 and 2018. At a rate of 59% respondents say they “tend to trust” radio compared with 34% of respondents who “tend not to trust” it (no change in the rate between these two years). In 2018, about half of Europeans (50%, -1% since 2017) say they “tend to trust” television, while 46% (+1%) “tend

not to trust” it. About half of Europeans in 2018 trusted the written press (47%), while 46% “tend not to trust” it.




Table 3. Trust in specific types of media – comparison 2017-2018. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2018)

Trust in specific types of media, sociodemographic analysis, 2018 (Eurobarometer 2018) and Trust in specific types of media during the Covid-19 pandemic 2021 (Eurobarometer 2020, 2021)

Table 4 breaks down the data already shown and discussed in Table 3 into socio-demographic categories, including age, gender, education and others. Data shows that there is little variation in terms of gender (again only “man” and “woman” are represented in this category) yet there is a worth mentioning increase in trust in the internet, from 34 and 30 in 2018 to 34 and 33 in 2021 for men and women respectively (+3 and +4%). We can speculate that the Covid management and the anti-vaccination movement played a role in that, as internet became an alternative means for information beyond official channels (there is an overall increase in internet trust during the 3 years from 2018 to 2021). Furthermore, there is a marked age difference regarding the trust in internet and the social media. People of older age, that is 55%, are much more cautious regarding the latter (20% and 10% for 2018 and 25% + 12% for 2021), which is the same as the retired (17% and 9% for 2018 and 20% and 10% for 2021). Contrary to that, people of younger age between 15-24 % do trust the internet and social media well

above average (45% and 31% for 2018 and 45% and 28% for 2021). Once again the class, financial ability and employment status seem to be particularly obvious variables in mistrusting the media, as the lower one is on social ladder the higher its mistrust will appear. This, again we can see, as a potentially healthy reaction on behalf of the economically unprivileged, a fact that however needs to be backed by qualitative data so as to be contextualized (or possibly problematized). Generally, these two tables show that, although certain media such as the written press and the internet show a slight increase in trust in 2021 compared with three years before, there has not been a significant change. This may strike as a less expected finding since the pandemic was obviously a massive event in terms of disrupting the fabric of everyday life for hundreds of millions of Europeans and in this regard one could expect a shift in institutional trust.

QA8a I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.
(% - EU - TEND TO TRUST)







	Radio	Television	The written press	The Internet	Online social networks
EU28	59	50	47	32	19
 Gender					
Man	57	47	47	34	19
Woman	60	52	48	30	18
 Age					
15-24	59	47	49	45	31
25-39	55	44	44	41	25
40-54	62	51	48	37	20
55 +	58	53	48	20	10
 Education (End of)					
15-	50	48	40	17	10
16-19	59	52	44	33	21
20+	63	49	54	35	17
Still studying	59	49	53	47	28
 Socio-professional category					
Self-employed	56	44	48	38	20
Managers	69	55	59	39	19
Other white collars	63	50	50	39	23
Manual workers	57	47	42	37	22
House persons	50	50	39	32	21
Unemployed	53	44	38	37	26
Retired	58	54	47	17	9
Students	59	49	53	47	28
 Difficulties paying bills					
Most of the time	48	39	36	29	19
From time to time	53	46	43	34	22
Almost never/ Never	62	53	51	32	17
 Consider belonging to					
The working class	52	47	37	25	16
The lower middle class	57	47	44	32	19
The middle class	62	52	52	36	20
The upper middle class	71	57	67	38	15
The upper class	66	58	59	40	23

Table 4. Trust in specific types of media, sociodemographic analysis. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2018)

QA6a How much trust do you have in certain media? For each of the following media, do you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
(% - EU - TEND TO TRUST)

	Radio	Television	The written press	The Internet	Online social networks
EU27	58	51	51	35	19
Gender					
Man	59	49	51	38	20
Woman	58	52	51	33	19
Age					
15-24	58	47	52	45	29
25-39	56	45	49	44	25
40-54	61	51	53	39	21
55+	58	56	51	25	12
Education (End of)					
15-	46	48	37	18	11
16-19	53	49	44	34	21
20+	66	53	61	40	18
Still studying	62	52	59	46	28
Socio-professional category					
Self-employed	56	50	53	42	21
Managers	73	58	67	42	18
Other white collars	63	52	55	46	25
Manual workers	53	44	42	36	24
House persons	50	50	42	30	18
Unemployed	43	35	36	36	22
Retired	58	56	49	20	10
Students	62	52	59	46	28
Difficulties paying bills					
Most of the time	38	34	32	30	17
From time to time	50	47	42	37	22
Almost never/ Never	64	54	56	35	18
Consider belonging to					
The working class	46	41	36	25	15
The lower middle class	53	47	44	35	20
The middle class	63	54	56	39	22
The upper middle class	75	64	72	39	17
The upper class	65	60	61	47	24

Table 5. Trust in specific types of media during the Covid-19 pandemic. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2021)

Evolution of trust in specific types of media from 2009 to 2018 (Eurobarometer 2018)

Table 6 shows the evolution of the levels of trust when it comes to different types of media from 2009 to 2018. The majority of respondents trust the radio and television, and, as also seen above, trust less the Internet or online social networks. They are more or less divided when it comes to the written press yet we should notice that trust in written press shows the biggest increase compared to all other types of media throughout this period from 42% to 47 % increase. Radio continues to be the most trusted medium and has a stable outlook as nearly six out of ten respondents (59%) trust radio, while one third of them (34%) do not trust it.

Television ranks a bit lower (50%) but it similarly has a stable outlook throughout time (it has only been increased by 1% since 2008).

A minority of Europeans say that they trust the internet and social media. 32% of respondents (which is 2 % less compared with 2017) say that they “tend to trust” the internet, while over half of them “tend not to trust” it (53%, increase of 2%). This is the lowest level of trust in the internet that recorded between 2009 and 2018, a decrease of five percentage points (from 37% in 2009 to 32% in 2018), a decrease which is the highest recorded in all media. Even worse, only under one-fifth of Europeans (19%, 1 percentage point less compared with 2017) say that they tend to trust online social networks, while more than six out of ten (63%, +1) say that they tend not to trust them. This is the lowest level of trust ever observed since 2014, although it has remained relatively stable over the whole period (ranging between 21 % and 19% between 2014 and 2018 and according to other tables and figures it can be increasing, e.g., figure 1).

QA8a I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. (% - EU - TEND TO TRUST)




Table 6. Evolution of trust in specific types of media from 2009 to 2018. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2018)

5.2.2.2.3 Trust in specific types of news sources

Most Trusted News Sources, 2023 (Flash Eurobarometer 2023)

This topic is different than trust in media as the question asked is whether respondents trust media as *news sources* (while media may be sources of other items, such as entertainment for instance). In this 2023 report, 48% of respondents trust *public* TV and radio stations, including their online platforms, as their most trusted *source of news*. Yet this level of trust in public TV and radio stations varies significantly from country to country. For instance, in Finland, a significant majority of respondents, 71%, express trust in public TV and radio stations. However, the level of trust is for instance, considerably lower in Hungary, with only 25% of respondents expressing trust, or in Poland, with 26% of respondents trusting public TV and radio. This cannot tell us much about trust in media in EU as a whole, manifesting the fragmentation of Europeans across national lines. This is similar to the trust in the written press, which varies significantly across countries. 38% of respondents consider the written press, including their online presence, to be a reliable source of media yet for instance, Sweden, Finland, Luxemburg and the Netherlands have a much higher percentage of respondents (more than 50%) who trust the written press, whereas Bulgaria, Czech republic, Latvia, and Poland have significantly lower percentages (around 20%). In contrast to public media, which display higher levels of trust, only 29% of respondents mentioned private TV and radio stations as news sources.

The table also clearly shows that traditional broadcast and print media, along with their online presence, are considered more reliable sources of news compared to online news platforms and social media channels like YouTube. Around 16% of respondents trust the people they follow on social media to provide them with accurate news. Similarly, 14% have the same level of trust in YouTube or other video platforms. About 12% rely on online news platforms, including blogs and podcasts, while 9% trust influencers on social media channels like YouTube and Instagram. In comparison to the Media and News survey conducted in 2022, the levels of trust in traditional broadcast and print media, as well as their online presence, have remained relatively consistent across various age groups. There has been a noticeable rise in trust in online news platforms and social media channels as sources of information, which is evident across various age groups and countries.

Q7 | Which news sources do you trust the most? [maximum three answers]

	EU27	BE	BG	CZ	DK	DE	EE	IE	EL	ES	FR	HR	IT	CY	LV	LT	LU	HU	MT	NL	AT	PL	PT	RO	SI	SK	FI	SE
Public TV and radio stations (incl. online)	48	56	49	45	61	54	59	56	39	48	46	46	45	45	50	54	59	25	39	60	50	26	65	43	48	46	71	63
The written press (incl. online)	38	50	20	21	44	38	47	44	34	44	43	25	39	33	22	30	54	22	35	56	41	21	54	25	26	24	56	53
Private TV and radio stations (incl. online)	29	23	21	27	17	22	21	22	31	40	30	29	28	39	19	23	27	18	26	25	27	41	53	38	21	24	25	16
People, groups or friends I follow on social media	16	13	22	22	13	13	17	24	25	16	11	23	13	24	20	25	13	28	16	12	16	29	11	20	18	19	13	13
YouTube or other video platforms	14	10	25	15	8	12	15	15	23	11	13	13	13	19	22	23	10	24	10	8	12	24	9	22	11	12	9	13
Other online news platforms incl. blogs, podcasts	12	9	20	15	7	6	13	17	29	14	7	15	16	22	12	15	10	28	25	11	8	15	9	19	14	16	9	13
Influencers on social media (e.g. YouTube, Instagram)	9	7	11	11	7	8	8	12	8	9	8	6	10	7	19	13	6	14	6	7	7	10	5	12	7	8	9	8
Other	6	3	7	6	5	9	2	5	7	5	5	9	6	2	5	5	4	10	6	4	6	5	3	5	9	7	2	3
Don't know	11	12	7	11	14	12	9	6	4	10	14	12	11	6	9	7	7	10	11	9	10	12	7	9	13	13	4	7

Most-selected response

Flash Eurobarometer FL012EP – Media & News Survey 2023 / Fieldwork: 18/10 – 24/10/2023

44 | (%) Base: n=25 956 – All respondents (EU27)



Table 7. Most Trusted News Sources – by country. Source: Flash Eurobarometer (2023)


Most Trusted News Sources, sociodemographic analysis, 2023 (Flash Eurobarometer 2023)

The socio-demographic analysis of the above shows that the younger respondents clearly place more trust in online news platforms, video platforms, social media channels and influencers than the older ones. For instance, people aged 55 or above trust online news platforms (including blogs and podcasts) by 9%, while this percentage rises to 17% for those aged 15-24, that is almost double increase in the percentage. In contrast, older respondents tend to have more trust in public and private TV and radio stations, including their online presence, as well as the written press. While one can argue that simply older people may not be as familiar with online media as young people are, this increased level of trust in online media as sources of news by young people may enable a trend in European landscape in the decades to come. The question is, as these young people become older will they continue display the same trust in online news or will their trust recede with age? If the former, then we can argue that the

“unofficial” online news sources may gradually become more significant for European audience landscapes.

Another figure that stands out is the respondents with higher levels of education (20 + years) tend to prefer the written press, including newspapers, magazines and their online versions. They also show a greater inclination towards other online news platforms, such as blogs and podcasts than other respondents do.

Q7 | Which news sources do you trust the most? [maximum three answers]



Flash Eurobarometer FL012EP – Media & News Survey 2023 / Fieldwork: 18/10 – 24/10/2023
42 | (%) Base: n=25 956– All respondents (EU27)



Table 8. Most Trusted News Sources, sociodemographic analysis – 2023 Source: (Flash Eurobarometer 2023)

5.2.2.2.4 Trust in the information provided by the media (by country)

Trust in the information provided by the media, by country, 2023 (Eurobarometer 2023)

This is again a slightly different topic as the question is whether people trust the *information* coming from the media not the media itself, as a news source or otherwise. In other words, the tables below tell us whether the European public believe the information they receive or not (which may be news but not only, it can be information received from documentaries or other shows). The table below regards national media (not European wide) and most people believe that their national media is reliable, although the level of trust varies greatly from country to

country. People believe what they hear in their national media in Sweden (90%), Finland (88%), and Denmark (82%), while in contrast people are skeptical towards the information they receive in Greece (62%), Malta (53%), Slovenia (51%) and Spain with (50%).




Table 9. Trust in the information provided by the media 2023. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2023)

Trust in information provided by the media, sociodemographic analysis, 2023

The socio-demographic data of pan-European trust in the information people receive from their national media, shows, similarly to the previous socio-demographic analysis presented above, that there is almost no difference when it comes to gender (61% of men and 60% of women tend to trust the information they receive from their national media). The percentages are also, unlike previous tables, quite stable among various age groups. Again here, there is a distinction in the perception of reliable information provided by the media based on the level of education as among respondents who completed full-time education at age 20 or older, 65% believe in the reliability of the information that media provides in their country, whereas only 55% of those who left education at age 15 or younger share the same belief. Questions of class, privilege and financial ability are again here pertinent. Managers, at a rate of 71%, tend to see their national media as a trustworthy source of information, while the unemployed only do at a rate of 45%. Those who rarely or never experience financial challenges when it comes to

paying their bills do trust the media with a percentage of 64%, compared to 47% of those who frequently face financial difficulties. The working class believes in the information provided by the media the least (51%), showing again that the relative distrust is predicated upon higher rates of economic and social exclusion.

QE7.1 For each of the following statements, please tell to what extent it corresponds or not to the situation of the (NATIONALITY) media:
(NATIONALITY) media provide trustworthy information
 (% - EU)

	Total 'Yes'	Total 'No'	Don't know
EU27	60	35	4
Gender			
Man	61	35	3
Woman	60	35	4
Age			
15-24	60	34	5
25-39	60	36	3
40-54	62	35	3
55 +	61	34	4
Education (End of)			
15-	55	37	7
16-19	58	38	3
20+	65	32	2
Still studying	66	29	4
Socio-professional category			
Self-employed	62	34	3
Managers	71	27	1
Other white collars	59	36	4
Manual workers	56	39	4
House persons	55	36	8
Unemployed	45	51	3
Retired	61	34	4
Students	66	29	4
Difficulties paying bills			
Most of the time	47	48	4
From time to time	57	38	4
Almost never/ Never	64	32	3
Consider belonging to			
The working class	51	41	6
The lower middle class	57	39	3
The middle class	65	32	2
The upper middle class	73	26	1
The upper class	62	34	3
Image of the EU			
Positive	73	23	3
Neutral	57	37	5
Negative	39	58	2

Table 10. Trust in information provided by the media - socio-demographic analysis, 2023. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2023)

Trust in the information provided by the media, by country, 2018 (Eurobarometer 2018)

In the 2018 survey, a majority of Europeans (58%) have confidence in the information provided by the media in their respective countries while a minority (36%) does not. In the 2021 survey there is an increase in trust (62% vs 34%), which is a rather noticeable number in the span of three years given that the latter survey took place during the COVID-19 pandemic. There is a sharp decline in France between these years from 48% to 40%, while there is increase in countries like Spain from 44% to 49%, Finland (already with the highest level of trust) from 85% to 88% and a rather sharp increase in Italy from 54% to 60%. While the trend is generally for increasing trust in the information received by national media, likewise increase and decrease in data figures is inconsistent and begs for contextual (qualitative) analysis.




Table 11. Trust in the information provided by the media, 2018, by country. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2018)

Trust in the information provided by the media, by country, 2021 (Eurobarometer 2020-2021)




Table 12. Trust in the information provided by the media 2020-2021, by country. Source: Standard Eurobarometer (2021)

5.2.2.2.5. Special topics: old media vs new media by age, ideology and ecosystem for news about Covid-19


The following section concerns “special topics”, which have to do with ideology, age and ideology, technology adoption, ecosystem for news about Covid-19, definitions of trust; as for certain topics we could not find EU data, we did use data from the US as an indicative measure for future analysis of trust in the deliverables that follow.

New media vs old media divide, by age: trust in information from social media vs trust in information from national and local news media, by age 2022 in US (Pew Research Center 2022)

The most remarkable thing that this data shows is that U.S. adults under 30 trust information from social media almost as much as from national news outlets, 50 % vs 56 %. This is an important insight, showing this global trend (not simply a European one) is much more pronounced in the US. As discussed with the data above this may be indicating a future trend that policy-makers need to take into consideration as national news organizations can become gradually less trustworthy compared to social media and other online sources, including bloggers and Influencers.

U.S. adults under 30 are now almost as likely to trust information on social media sites as information from national news outlets

% of U.S. adults who say they have **some or a lot of trust** in the information they get from ...



Note: In 2016, trust of information from social media was only asked of and based on internet-using U.S. adults. In the question on trust in the information from social media sites, the examples used have changed over time; for more detail on the specific wording, see the topline. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 18-Aug. 21, 2022. For dates of other surveys, see the topline.


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Table 13. Trust in information from social media vs trust in information from national news outlets by age. Source: Pew Research Center (2022)

Most Trusted News Sources compared – 2023 vs 2022, by age (Flash Eurobarometer 2023)

If we compare this with the table below that shows European trust in news sources then we notice a similar trend yet in Europe the percentage of young people trusting the Internet and online news is markedly lower compared to the US. Nevertheless, the trust in all types of online sources, including people and social media groups, YouTube and other video platforms, blogs and podcasts and Influencers is increasing across all age categories.

Q7 | Which news sources do you trust the most? [maximum three answers]



Note: Survey results are subject to sampling tolerances and only trend differences that are statistically significant – i.e. where it can be reasonably certain that they have occurred by chance – are shown in the chart/table. (The indication ns means that no statistically significant change is seen in the data.)

Flash Eurobarometer FL012EP – Media & News Survey 2023 / Fieldwork: 18/10 – 24/10/2023

43 | (%) Base: n=25 956 – All respondents (EU27)




Table 14. Most Trusted News Sources compared – 2023 vs 2022, by age. Source: Flash Eurobarometer (2023)

General information ecosystem - context: trust in sources for news about Covid-19, 2021 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism) (2021)

The table below shows the citizen’s trust in different types of authorities and institutions during COVID-19 across 8 countries, including two Europeans, Germany and Spain. Therefore, the table has a global and comparable outlook, which should be taken with a grain of salt as it represents very different political and social contexts. However, from the data we can infer some basic assumptions, such as that in the eight countries surveyed, approximately half of the respondents consider news organisations to be a fairly reliable source of COVID-19 information. In the European countries, this percentage is 52% for Germany and 46% for Spain, which means that at least in these two European countries trust in media as sources of information was higher during the non-Covid-19 time. In Germany the fall in percentage is much more dramatic if we consider the 77% trust in information provided by the media as reported in the Table 12 for 2021 (-25%) while in Spain the trust in media as sources of information was 49% according to the same table (drop of 3 % during Covid-19).

Figure 5. Proportion that trust each for news about COVID-19




Q10. How trustworthy would you say news and information about coronavirus (COVID-19) from the following is? Please use the scale below, where 0 is 'not at all trustworthy' and 10 is 'completely trustworthy'. Base: Total sample in each country. Note: Trusts = 6-10.

Table 15. Trust in sources for news about Covid-19, 2021 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism) (2021)


New media vs old media divide, covid-19 context: Trust in new media (digital platforms in general) vs trust in old media (news organisation) for information about covid-19, 2021 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021))

There is a similar picture considering the trust in online media. Trust in online media is obviously lower than trust in traditional media during COVID-19 in almost all cases in global data in Table 16. Yet if we compare this trust with the trust that Europeans show in online media in Figure 8 then the picture becomes more complicated. For Germany, Table 7 says that people trusted online media within a range from 8 to 13% during 2023, while Table 16 says that they trusted the information they received from online media within a range from 15 to 33%. The same is for Spain, as the overall trust in online media, which is from 9 to 16%, becomes 16 to 38% when it comes to COVID-19. Here, we should note that Table 7 does not specifically refer to search engines (as Table 16 does), and that the search engines in general seem to be the more trusted online media in general. Still, this comparison opens up the question of whether Europeans trusted more online media during COVID-19 than what they regularly do, which is a question that needs to be elaborated with further data (and not only about Germany and Spain, see also Tables 5 & 6).


Figure 7. Trust gap between platforms and news organisations for news and information about COVID-19
UK




US




Germany




Spain




South Korea




Japan



Argentina



Brazil



Q10. How trustworthy would you say news and information about coronavirus (COVID-19) from the following is? Please use the scale below, where 0 is 'not at all trustworthy' and 10 is 'completely trustworthy'. **Q11.** How trustworthy would you say news and information about coronavirus (COVID-19) on each of the following is? Please use the scale below, where 0 is 'not at all trustworthy' and 10 is 'completely trustworthy'. *Base: Total sample in each country. Note: Trusts = 6–10.*

Table 16 .Trust in new media (digital platforms in general) vs trust in old media (news organisation) for information about covid-19, 2021

Trust and Ideology and Range and Ideology: Trust in diversity of news sources US by ideology, range illustrated, 2019 (Pew Research Centre 2020)

The following tables look at another variable, which is media trust and political beliefs and ideologies. The tables are from the US, as there was no existing data for Europe in the sources we looked at and we thought that it is important to highlight this variable in the context of the qualitative research that will follow.

Democrats are far more likely to trust national news outlets than Republicans

% of U.S. adults who have some or a lot of trust in the information that comes from ...

	National news organizations	Local news organizations	Social media sites
All U.S. adults	61%	71%	33%
Men	59	71	31
Women	62	72	33
Ages 18-29	56	62	50
30-49	58	70	36
50-64	62	73	25
65+	67	79	20
High school or less	57	69	35
Some college	56	69	32
College+	70	77	30
White	59	72	26
Black	67	74	43
Hispanic	62	70	47
Asian*	70	67	46
Rep/Lean Rep	42	63	27
Dem/Lean Dem	77	79	38

*Estimates for Asian adults are representative of English speakers only.

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic; Hispanic adults are of any race. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 18-Aug. 21, 2022.

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Table 17. Trust information from social media vs trust in information from national news outlets by socio-demographic analysis, including political ideology. Source: Pew Research Center (2022)

Democrats express more trust of most news sources asked about; Republicans express more distrust

Number of sources more trusted and more distrusted for political and election news, among 30 asked about

30 SOURCES:



Democrats trust
more than distrust
22 sources



Republicans distrust
more than trust 10
sources



- Source that is **trusted** by more people than distrusted
- Source that is **distrusted** by more people than trusted
- Source is **about equally trusted** as distrusted

Note: Partisans include leaners.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Oct. 29-Nov. 11, 2019.


"U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Table 18. Trust in diversity/range of news sources US by ideology, 2019 (Pew Research Centre 2020)

Large differences in news sources trusted by Democrats and Republicans

% who trust each source for political and election news (sources trusted by 33% or more shown)




Note: Order of outlets does not necessarily indicate statistically significant differences.
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Oct. 29-Nov. 11, 2019.
 "U.S. Media Polarization and the 2020 Election: A Nation Divided"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Table 19. Trust in diversity of news sources US by ideology, range illustrated, 2019 (Pew Research Centre 2020)

Finally, in this section, we include a Table about media trust and AI. Again, the data on this topic is sparse but the following study from the Reuters Institute portrays an overall gloomy picture of media trust after the introduction of AI and Generative AI. Most respondents (70%) believe that trust levels will drop after the establishment of these technologies in the media field.

70% of respondents think that AI and Generative AI will, on balance, lower trust levels in the news overall



Q17. Thinking about the possible impact of AI and generative AI on the public's overall trust in the news, do you think it will overall raise trust or lower trust? *Base: 293.*

Table 20. Forecasted impact of AI and generative AI on the public's overall trust in the news. Source: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2024)

Trusting most news, most of the times, 2021 and 2023, Digital News Report, Reuters Institute

Table 21. Image abridged from Digital News Report, Reuters Institute, 2021. I think I can trust most news most of the time, by European Media System

PROPORTION THAT TRUSTS MOST NEWS MOST OF THE TIME - ALL MARKETS




Table 22. Image abridged from Digital News Report, Reuters Institute, 2023. I think I can trust most news most of the time, by European Media System – note the numbers for comparison refer to Digital News Report 2022

PROPORTION THAT TRUST MOST NEWS MOST OF THE TIME - ALL MARKETS




Table 21 and 22 (from the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021 and 2023, including in this latter, reference for comparison to 2022 report too) refer to the percentages of people trusting most news most of the time. Although an elaboration from the Reuters Institute covering the 2021-2023 period is not publicly available, the juxtaposition of the publicly available data for this trust question shows how trust in the media – declined as trust in news - has evolved during the Covid-19 crisis in several EU countries. That is, the amount of people who trust most news most of the time has declined consistently across the period in all media systems, though the decline is more pronounced in the Western, Southern and especially, Eastern Media systems.


5.2.2.2.6. Trust in Institutions

Below we present some tables around trust in EU, institutions and democracy. The Table below shows the urban/ rural divide in trust in the years during Covid-19, where there is an obvious drop of trust in trust in government an trust in the EU across residents of rural areas, towns and cities. The trust in the EU is stronger than the trust in national governments across all areas, while there is a clear gap with how people are satisfied with democracy between cities and rural areas.

Living, working and COVID-19 e-survey, Democracy and Trust during Covid-19, Trust in Media and Institutions

Trust in government, in the EU, and satisfaction with democracy

● 2020 ● 2022



Source: [Living, working and COVID-19 e-survey, round 5 \(2022\)](#) • Note: Scale ranges from 1 to 10, with 1 representing the lowest level of trust/satisfaction. Satisfaction with democracy data only available from 2022.

Table 23. Living, working and COVID-19 e-survey, round 5 (2022).

<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/data-catalogue/trust-government-eu-and-satisfaction-democracy-rural-urban-divide>

Democracy and trust during COVID-19 Democracy: level of satisfaction - COVIDR5

On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?




Table 24. Democracy and Trust during Covid-19 <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/data-catalogue/living-working-and-covid-19-5th-round-may-2022/democracy-level-satisfaction-covidr5>

QA8a I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.
(% - EU)




Table 25. Standard Eurobarometer 99 (2023) Standard Eurobarometer 99 - Spring 2023
<https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3052>

Lastly, there is a table showing the general trust in the EU and national governments and parliaments. If we compare this with the general data on media, we can assume that there is no necessary correlation with trust in traditional (national) media and trust in national institutions, such as the parliament and the government, since the former is markedly higher than the latter. This means that there is a percentage of people trusting the media but not trusting their national representatives.

While table 26 shows a bleak picture about European trust during these years, there is anthropological evidence that the horizontal trust increased, at least in places like in Greece which was under severe economic crisis (Rakopoulos, 2015). Furthermore, even if the distinction is not always as clear cut, we could argue that eventually these two are distinct insofar as trusting (or mistrusting) the state means trusting (or mistrusting) power, which is a higher abstract authority, while trusting (or mistrusting) the people is more about everyday communication/ embodiment/ trust between more or less “equals”.

The general perception of the EU remains stable

Most general indicators remain stable. Notably, 47% of the EU population **tend to trust the EU** while 32% tend to trust national governments. 45% tend not to trust the EU.

QA6 How much trust do you have in certain institutions? For each of the following institutions, do you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? (% - EU - TEND TO TRUST)




Table 26. Trust in the EU, National Parliament and National Government over time

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

This deliverable laid out theoretical and conceptual considerations, including the importance of trust and mistrust, the notion of trustworthiness and the significance of media transparency and journalistic ethics for solidifying democratic institutions. A consequence of the lack of trust in media and institutions in general can pose a threat to democratic values, including citizen's participation. On the other hand, once again, blindly trusting the government and social institutions (and especially media) is not always a desirable scenario for a democratic society. Anti-democratic governments are also cultivating relations of trust with citizens, which from a democratic perspective should be seen with caution.

By looking at the data, we can argue that an operational definition of media trust measures media trust in *general* without making reference to specific types of media. Conversely, media trust can also be understood in relation to the kind of media it applies to, that is, trust in radio, trust in TV, trust in the press, trust in the Internet, trust in online social networks. In this case, there emerge not one single media trust but a number of media trusts *in the plural*. Another specific articulation of media trust involves focusing on the *content* that media provide and therefore, on the degree to which this content can be trusted. There follows a focus on trusting specific types of *news sources*, or on trusting the *information* provided by media. Here a distinction is being made between trust in media and trust in information or news provided by the media.

Further nuances of media trust foreground factors that shape media trust, for example, key social demographic such as education, age, ideology, income and job. A specific mention ought to be done here concerning the special role that age and ideology have been conferred, operationally, as factors impacting directly on media trust. This foregrounded is also reflected in the academic literature with a number of studies foregrounding age (e.g., Rodríguez-Pérez and Canel 2023; Conti and Memoli 2016; Schranz et al. 2018; Brosius, Ohme and de Vreese 2022) and ideology (e.g. Brenan 2019; Jones 2004; Stiernstedt 2021; Schranz et al. 2018) as factors impacting on media trust and indirectly, on trust in political institutions.

There were a number of survey items which tested specifically the impact that ideological partisanship has on trust in the media. It has to be noted that this kind of information is particularly foregrounded in media trust research based in the United States, which, with a long history of two-party system is more prone to political polarisation and thus characterised by a unique media system. Suiter and Fletcher (2020, p. 496) remind that the importance of partisanship [in studying media trust] is “too influenced by what we know about dynamics in

the United States”, and that such a factor may play a lesser role in the contexts of other media systems, such as the European ones.

The number or *range* of sources trusted is also a factor that is strictly related to media trust and mediated by ideology and partisanship. Special articulations of media trust include mapping out elements of the *context* in which the media operate. For example, media are placed as authoritative source of information on COVID-19 (to be more or less trusted) in a general informational ecosystem populated by *other authoritative sources* such as governments, politicians, scientists, National or global Health organisations, common citizens. More context which is useful to the operational conceptualisation of media trust concerns the relation of media to the general technological ecosystem, for example, in the context of the *early adoption of artificial intelligence*, expected to impact on media trust.

A final articulation of media trust emerged from this review, involves the subtle distinction between trusting news in general and trusting the news that readers specifically use. This is a distinction between an *abstract* definition of news and one that is situated in a context of *use*, such as the latter. During Covid-19, for instance, there are hints in the data that people in Germany and Spain relied more online media than they regularly do, which means they some part of the population might have been looking for alternative narratives. Besides, an apparent finding from looking at the data is that younger people are trusting online media more (and in some cases like in the US this trust seems to be growing and even compete with trust in traditional media). Especially people trust search engines, which provide algorithmically curated (and vertically listed) pieces of information by corporations like Google. While obviously there is still a big gap between trust in traditional media and online media (apart from search engines), we would certainly need to pay attention to the political identities that unravel in (and through) the online world, especially for the youth which seems to be structuring, to a large extent, its identity online.

A theme that stands out in the analysis of the data is that poorer people and people with less prestigious status and jobs tend to have a markedly higher distrust in media than middle or high class people or people with higher paid jobs. This introduces social class to the discussion as one of the factors that needs to be paid attention to and underscores the value of taking mistrust in established institutions seriously.

Finally, we should reiterate that surveys and data should be treated with caution, as on the one hand the study of trust over time in already available data is most of the times unsystematic (i.e. themes and questions are not the same) or it may happen in very diverse media ecosystems. If, to quote Simmel again, trust is “a hypothesis regarding future behavior,

a hypothesis certain enough to serve as a basis for practical conduct” then from the perspective of this deliverable we would like to highlight the need for more contextual research for interpreting the collective modes of hypothesizing. This is the job of the deliverables that follow in this Work Package.

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
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
Appendix 1

Here we add some additional tables, mostly from Statista, which we think are useful for a further consideration of the themes highlighted above.




Appendix Table 1: Most Trusted News Sources Worldwide


<https://www.statista.com/statistics/381455/most-trusted-sources-of-news-and-info-worldwide/>




Appendix Table 2: Share of respondents who tended to trust the written press in countries in the European Union as of February 2022 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/454403/europe-trust-in-the-written-press-by-country/>




Appendix Table 3: Share of respondents who tended to trust the internet in the European Union (EU 27) countries as of 2022 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/422787/europe-trust-in-the-internet-by-country/>



Appendix Table 4 : <https://www.statista.com/statistics/454399/europe-trust-in-television-by-country/> Share of people who tended to trust in television in the European Union countries in 2022




Appendix Table 5: Index of respondents' trust towards media in European Union (EU 28) countries in 2019 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/454409/europe-media-trust-index/>




Appendix Table 6: Trust in the news among news consumers in selected European countries in 2016
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/297852/trust-in-online-news-providers-by-type-uk/>


Trust in media in selected countries worldwide from 2021 to 2023



Appendix Table 7: Trust in media in selected countries worldwide 2021-2023
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/683336/media-trust-worldwide/>




Appendix Table 8: Share of respondents who used the following media every day or almost every day in the European Union from 2011 to 2023 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/422572/europe-daily-media-usage/>



Appendix Table 9: Share of people who tended to trust in television in the European Union countries in 2022

The Countries Trusting the Government Most and Least

Share of people in selected countries who said they trusted their national government in 2023 (in percent)




Around 1,150 respondents surveyed per country Nov. 3-22, 2023
Source: 2024 Edelman Trust Barometer




statista

Appendix Table 10: The Countries trusting the Government Most and Least
<https://www.statista.com/chart/7676/the-uk-ranks-low-for-trust-in-government/>



Appendix Table 11: Share of journalists who believe that the public has lost trust in the media over the past year worldwide from 2017 to 2022,
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1235363/journalists-attitudes-to-media-trust-loss-worldwide/>


Trust in journalists worldwide as of June 2023, by country



Appendix Table 12: Trust in journalists worldwide as of June 2023, by country, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1274281/trust-in-journalists-worldwide-by-country/>

Figure 1.

Trust in news versus trust in news people use



Q6_2016_1. I think you can trust most news most of the time. Q6_2016_6. I think I can trust most of the news I consume most of the time.

Base: Total sample in each country. Brazil = 2058, UK = 2011, US = 2055.

Source: Digital News Report 2020

Appendix Table 13: Definition of trust: trust in news in general vs trust in news people use (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 2020)

Appendix 2

This is the extended list of each table that we used to identify each topic (the topics are in italics followed by the names of the tables):

Trust in media in general [Trust in media in general 2023 (Eurobarometer 2023), Trust in media (general), sociodemographic analysis, 2023 (Eurobarometer 2023)]

*Trust in specific types of media (radio, tv, press, internet, online social network)*² [Trust in specific types of media during the Covid-19 pandemic 2021 (Eurobarometer 2020, 2021), Trust in specific types of media, sociodemographic analysis, 2018 (Eurobarometer 2018), Trust in specific types of media, comparison 2017-2018 (Eurobarometer 2018), Evolution of trust in specific types of media from 2009 to 2018 (Eurobarometer 2018)]

Trust in specific types of news sources [Most Trusted News Sources, 2023 (Flash Eurobarometer 2023), Most Trusted News Sources, sociodemographic analysis, 2023 (Flash Eurobarometer 2023), Most Trusted News Sources compared – 2023 vs 2022 (Flash Eurobarometer 2023), Most Trusted News Sources – by country (Flash Eurobarometer 2023) Most Trusted News Sources – by country 2023 vs 2022 (Flash Eurobarometer 2023)]

² Info from Eurobarometer 2023 is missing

Trust in the information provided by the media (by country) [Trust in the information provided by the media, by country, 2023 (Eurobarometer 2023), Trust in information provided by the media, sociodemographic analysis, 2023, Trust in the information provided by the media, by country, 2021 (Eurobarometer 2020-2021), Trust in the information provided by the media, by country, 2018 (Eurobarometer 2018)]

Special topics: diversity of news sources, old media vs new media by age and ideology, ecosystem for news about Covid-19 [New media vs old media divide, by age: trust in information from social media vs trust in information from national and local news media, by age 2022 (Pew Research Center 2022), New media vs old media divide, by ideology: Trust information from social media vs trust in information from national and local news media, by socio-demographic analysis, political ideology foregrounded (Pew Research Center 2022)
General information ecosystem - context: trust in sources for news about Covid-19, 2021 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism) (2021), New media vs old media divide, covid-19 context: Trust in new media (digital platforms in general) vs trust in old media (news organisation) for information about covid-19, 2021 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021), Range and Ideology: Trust in diversity/range of news sources by ideology 2019 (Pew Research Centre 2020), Range and Ideology: Trust in diversity of news sources US by ideology, range illustrated, 2019 (Pew Research Centre 2020), New technology adoption context: trust in news by impact of AI and generative AI 2024 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2024)]

Trust in Institutions [Living, working and COVID-19 e-survey, round 5 (2022), Democracy and Trust during Covid-19, Trust in EU Institutions, Standard Eurobarometer 99 (2023) Standard Eurobarometer 99 - Spring 2023, Trust in the EU, National Parliament and National Government over time]